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						𝑈) = 𝑦 𝑥 − 𝑤	
𝑈, = 𝑤 − 𝑐(𝑥, 𝜃)	
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there	are	two	types	of	agents,	𝜃 ∈ {𝜃A, 𝜃B}	and	as	before	we	let	𝑏 = Pr	[𝜃 = 𝜃B|𝒽],	then	we	can	
introduce	a	term	for	the	psychic	utility	an	agent	receives	for	being	perceived	to	be	a	high	type:	
𝑈, = 𝑤 − 𝑐 𝑥, 𝜃 + 𝑣(𝑏)	
where	𝑣	is	increasing	in	𝑏.	Then	the	agent’s	FOC	is	moderated	by	the	effect	of	her	choice	on	the	
principal’s	beliefs:	
𝑑𝑐(𝑥, 𝜃)
𝑑𝑥
=
𝑑𝑣 𝑏
𝑑𝑏
𝑑𝑏
𝑑𝑥
	
Therefore,	an	agent	chooses	a	level	of	𝑥	where	marginal	cost	of	effort	is	equal	to	her	marginal	psychic	
utility.	In	particular,	the	agent	may	behave	altruistically	and	reciprocally	because	she	wants	the	principal	
to	perceive	her	as	altruistic	or	reciprocal	(see	Benabou	and	Tirole,	2006).	Empirically,	there	is	growing	
support	for	image	maintenance	as	an	important	mechanism	underlying	altruistic	or	reciprocal	
dispositions.	For	example,	effort	on	a	task	that	generates	payoffs	for	a	charity	is	reduced	when	a	
personal	financial	incentive	is	added	and	the	presence	of	this	incentive	is	public	knowledge	(Ariely	et	al.,	
2009).	This	is	consistent	with	people	caring	about	their	social	image	and	finding	less	value	in	being	pro-
social	when	incentives	make	this	a	noisier	signal	of	a	good	disposition.14	This	social-image	aspect	of	
trustworthiness	is	potentially	important	in	the	context	of	the	law,	if	legal	rules	affect	the	signaling	value	
of	being	trustworthy	as	well	as	the	perceived	kindness	of	trusting.	
Agents	might	also	be	upset	with	the	principal	for	having	negative	beliefs.	Distrust	could	be	viewed	as	an	
“insult”	and	agents	might	resent	the	need	to	exert	effort	to	change	the	principal’s	beliefs.	In	this	case	
negative	reciprocity	motives	might	lead	agents	to	be	less	trustworthy	if	they	think	the	principal	does	not	
trust	them,	in	order	to	punish	the	principal	for	having	this	belief.	Thus,	even	laws	that	impose	some	
minimum	standards	of	performance,	but	do	not	prevent	signaling	trustworthiness	by	putting	in	more	
than	minimum	effort,	may	have	a	negative	impact;	imposing	the	minimum	may	signal	distrust,	and	
cause	the	individual	to	do	the	minimum	only	in	retaliation	(Falk	and	Kosfeld,	2006).	
So	far	we	have	focused	on	determinants	of	beliefs	about	trustworthiness,	but	psychological	factors	also	
play	a	role	in	determining	the	willingness	of	a	principal	to	trust	independent	of	the	principal’s	beliefs	
about	the	agent’s	disposition.	In	particular,	one	determinant	of	trust	is	risk	preference.	Trusting	is	like	
playing	a	lottery,	where	the	payoff	is	uncertain	given	some	uncertainty	about	the	degree	of	
trustworthiness	of	the	agent.	Standard	risk	aversion	can	cause	someone	to	be	less	willing	to	trust	for	a	
																																								 																				
14	Related	evidence	shows	that	subjects	are	willing	to	pay	to	exit	a	Dictator	Game	if	they	can	keep	most	of	the	
endowment	but	avoid	having	an	anonymous	other	know	that	sharing	would	have	been	possible	(Dana	et	al.,	2007).	
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given	belief	about	the	probability	that	the	agent	is	trustworthy.	Indeed,	risk	aversion	as	measured	by	
choices	in	lottery	experiments	predicts	willingness	to	trust	in	a	trust	game	(e.g.,	Schechter,	2005).		
There	is	also	evidence,	however,	that	people	have	a	special	aversion	to	having	their	trust	betrayed,	
above	and	beyond	that	which	can	be	explained	by	risk	aversion	over	financial	payoffs.	Bohnet	et	al.	
(2008)	demonstrate	“betrayal	aversion,”	where	the	willingness	to	pay	to	avoid	playing	a	lottery	
increases	if	the	outcome	of	the	lottery	depends	on	the	actions	of	another	human	being.	In	other	words,	
there	is	something	worse	about	getting	a	low	payoff	as	the	result	of	violated	trust,	as	opposed	to	getting	
the	same	payoff	as	the	result	of	a	lottery,	even	if	subjective	beliefs	equate	the	probabilities	of	a	bad	
outcome	in	the	lottery	situation	and	in	the	human	interaction	environment.	A	potential	explanation	for	
betrayal	aversion	is	an	anticipated	negative	emotional	experience,	which	a	person	expects	to	feel	if	they	
are	exploited.	Betrayal	aversion	is	also	an	example	of	how	affective	states	can	influence	the	choices	of	
the	principal.	If	the	principal	is	more	betrayal-averse,	he	or	she	may	be	more	concerned	about	the	risk	of	
any	interaction	since	possible	negative	outcomes	are	compounded	by	negative	emotional	experience.	
To	the	extent	that	institutions,	or	contracts,	are	structured	in	such	a	way	as	to	reduce	variance	in	
behavior,	or	risk	of	betrayal,	they	may	foster	willingness	to	trust.	On	the	other	hand,	if	the	presence	of	
legal	protections	signals	that	people	are	not	trustworthy,	this	could	actually	undermine	willingness	to	
trust,	if	principals	are	betrayal	averse	and	the	law	does	not	allow	perfect	contract	enforcement.	
Taken	together,	the	existing	evidence	indicates	a	potentially	complex	interaction	between	trust	and	law	
due	to	human	psychology.	Some	psychological	mechanisms	may	cause	trust	to	be	a	substitute	for	legal	
contract	enforcement,	but	such	mechanisms	also	can	lead	to	complementarities	between	trust	and	the	
law.	For	example,	to	the	extent	that	reciprocity	and	altruism	cause	agents	to	be	trustworthy,	legal	
enforcement	of	contracts	is	less	important.	If	contractual	enforcement	reduces	the	ability	of	agents	to	
signal	their	trustworthiness,	stronger	laws	might	reduce	trustworthiness	and	trust.	On	the	other	hand,	if	
principals	are	betrayal	averse,	and	law	brings	greater	certainty,	this	might	facilitate	trust,	thereby	
triggering	reciprocity	and	trustworthiness.	If	the	presence	of	strong	law	sends	a	negative	signal	about	
trustworthiness,	by	contrast,	this	could	reduce	willingness	to	trust.	We	discuss	various	laws	and	
institutions	in	detail	later	in	the	chapter	in	light	of	the	evidence	on	psychological	mechanisms.	
Game	Theory	Mechanisms	
Having	surveyed	the	behavioral	and	experimental	economics	literature	on	trust,	we	turn	to	what	has	
traditionally	been	a	distinct	literature	that	asks	the	same	question:	the	organizational	economics	
literature,	which	uses	neo-classical	game	theory	and	assumes	narrowly	self-interested	players	in	order	
to	understand	how	cooperation	can	be	sustained	in	principal-agent	transactions.	It	should	be	noted	that	
most	of	the	game	theory	models	are	based	on	infinitely	repeated	play	and	thus	are	not	directly	
applicable	to	the	experimental	evidence	or	the	baseline	model	we	presented	above,	which	is	largely	a	
one-shot	or	finitely	repeated	design.	However,	it	is	typically	argued	that	insights	from	theories	of	
repeated	games	are	useful	for	explaining	these	results	either	because	players	in	one-shot	games	follow	
heuristics	of	behavior	that	they	developed	while	playing	repeated	games	(Frank,	1988)	or	because	the	
existence	of	irrational	opponents	allows	repeated	game	equilibria	to	be	sustained	in	finite-move	games	
(Kreps,	Roberts,	Milgrom,		Wilson,	1982).		
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The	literature	on	relational	contracts	originated	primarily	with	Baker,	Gibbons	and	Murphy	(1994)	and	
MacLeod	and	Malcomson	(1989)	in	studies	designed	to	explore	how	principal-agent	problems	involving	
non-contractible	subjective	performance	can	be	circumvented	through	infinitely	repeated	interaction.	
Returning	to	our	model,	and	considering	narrowly	self-interested	agents,	recall	that	in	a	one-shot	game,	
agents	will	put	in	minimal	effort,	and	principals	will	anticipate	that	and	offer	minimal	investment.	
However,	the	well-known	folk-theorem	argues	that	in	a	repeated	setting	where	actions	can	be	
conditioned	on	past	behavior,	how	much	a	player	values	her	reputation	or	her	“reputational	capital”	can	
be	a	sufficient	incentive	to	maintain	a	socially	welfare	maximizing	equilibrium.	A	more	complete	survey	
of	the	theoretical	literature	can	be	found	in	MacLeod	(2007),	and	a	survey	of	this	literature	as	it	pertains	
to	law	can	be	found	in	Spier	(2006).		We	focus	here	on	the	elements	that	pertain	to	the	behavioral	
phenomenon	of	trust	and	how	it	interacts	with	legal	regimes.		
One	theme	of	the	literature	is	that	it	may	be	optimal	to	not	take	full	advantage	of	the	possibility	to	
specify	obligations	of	trading	partners	in	a	contract,	even	when	legal	institutions	allow	such	contractual	
enforcement.	The	basic	idea	is	that	the	efficiency	of	the	equilibrium	outcome	of	repeated	games	
depends	critically	on	what	happens	to	each	party	in	the	event	that	cooperation	breaks	down.	Laws	and	
institutions	that	protect	afflicted	parties	in	the	case	of	contract	breach	can	actually	make	cooperation	
more	difficult	because	they	improve	the	value	of	outside	options	and	thus	increase	the	temptation	to	
renege.		
For	example,	Bernheim	and	Whinston	(1998)	analyze	why	contracts	often	have	the	feature	of	“strategic	
ambiguity,”	where	parties	choose	incomplete	contracts	when	complete	contracts	are	available.	They	
find	that	incomplete	contracts	work	better	in	repeated	games	because	they	increase	the	degree	of	
punishment	available	when	either	party	shirks.	Similar	results	are	shown	in	Shaprio	and	Stiglitz	(1984)	
and	Levin	(2003)	who	show	that	the	power	of	a	performance	incentive	a	relational	contract	is	able	to	
provide	decreases	as	the	attractiveness	of	the	outside	option	increases.		
This	literature	also	considers	the	impact	laws	have	on	signaling,	but	again	in	the	context	of	contractual	
breach.	For	example,	Allen	and	Gale	(1993)	and	Spier	(1992)	note	that	parties	may	prefer	incomplete	
contracts	because	complete	contracts	serve	as	a	signal	of	the	intent	for	bad	behavior.	A	trustworthy	
person	would	not	need	to	spell	everything	out	in	a	complete	contract,	therefore	game	theory	suggests	
that	one	might	infer	that	someone	who	relies	on	complete	contracts	has	something	to	hide.	
A	different	theme	in	the	literature	is	that	certain	types	of	legal	institutions,	which	foster	the	possibility	
to	interact	repeatedly	over	long	time	frames,	will	be	complements	to	trust.	Legal	institutions	that	
facilitate	repeated	interactions	are	broadly	speaking	those	that	promote	stability,	e.g.,	limiting	the	
possibility	of	seizure	of	assets	by	the	state,	or	reducing	the	possibility	of	violence,	and	thereby	increasing	
the	chance	that	the	trading	partner	of	the	current	period	will	still	be	a	viable	partner	in	the	next	
period.The	potential	for	repeated	interactions	means	that	trading	partners	operate	under	“the	shadow	
of	the	future”,	allowing	the	possibility	for	cooperation	to	be	sustained	by	appropriately	chosen	
punishment	strategies	in	an	infinitely	repeated	game.	In	fact,	the	experimental	literature	shows	that	this	
idea	goes	through	even	in	finite	horizon	games.	Brown	et	al.	(2004)	show	in	the	lab	that	market	
efficiency	is	higher	when	market	participants	can	endogenously	engage	in	repeated	interactions	with	
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trading	partners	who	have	performed	well	in	the	past.	The	mechanism	is	“gift	exchange”,	in	the	sense	
that	principals	offer	generous	up	front	wages	to	agents	who	have	performed	well	in	the	past,	and	agents	
respond	by	being	trustworthy.	Efficiency	is	lower	when	institutions	create	instability	and	only	allow	one-
shot	interactions,	because	agents	become	less	reciprocal	in	the	absence	of	the	“shadow	of	the	future”.	
Notably,	while	institutions	fostering	repeated	interaction	make	gift	exchange	possible,	the	virtuous	cycle	
still	requires	principals	to	be	trusting	enough	to	pay	generous	wages.	Thus,	from	a	game	theoretic	
perspective,	trust	and	the	law	can	also	be	complements.	
A	related	theme	in	the	literature	stresses	the	importance	of	dissemination	of	information	about	past	
behavior.	If	future	players	“forget”	the	performance	of	trading	partners	in	the	past,	then	the	possibility	
for	repeated	interactions	loses	its	bite	in	terms	of	fostering	cooperation.	Milgrom,	North	and	Weingast	
(1990)	demonstrate	the	importance	of	institutions	that	disseminate	reputation	information	for	the	
development	of	medieval	international	trade.	The	theme	of	the	importance	of	information	systems	to	
maintain	reputation	has	also	been	developed	in	Greif	(1989,	1993)	and	Kranton	(1996).		
In	summary,	the	game	theory	literature	shows	mechanisms	through	which	the	use	of	contracts	to	
specify	agent	obligations	can	be	a	substitute	for	trust.	Similar	to	the	empirical	findings	on	trust	as	a	
substitute,	it	can	be	suboptimal	for	a	principal	to	take	advantage	of	the	opportunity	to	constrain	the	
choices	of	agents.	The	theory	also	outlines	mechanisms	through	which	strong	legal	institutions	may	be	
complements	to	trust,	namely	by	fostering	the	possibility	for	repeated	interactions.	
Trust	and	the	Law:	Substitutes	or	Complements?	
In	this	section	we	return	to	the	contrasting	experimental	evidence,	about	the	law	being	a	substitute	or	
complement	for	trust,	in	light	of	psychological	and	game	theoretic	mechanisms.		
One	interpretation	of	the	experimental	evidence	is	that	the	process	through	which	laws	are	
implemented	matters	for	whether	they	crowd	out	or	foster	trust.	In	the	studies	we	surveyed	where	trust	
and	the	law	were	substitutes,	the	law	took	the	form	of	externally	imposed	contractual	constraint	on	
agent	choices,	imposed	either	by	a	principal	or	by	the	experimenter.	By	contrast,	studies	where	
contractual	enforcement	was	imposed	through	referendum	found	that	law	was	a	complement	to	trust.	
The	process	through	which	contractual	constraints	are	imposed	thus	seems	to	matter.		
The	process	for	implementing	laws	may	matter	is	because	it	determines	what	“signal”	is	sent	about	
intrinsic	trustworthiness	of	agents.	Specifically,	laws	that	are	imposed	externally	and	that	serve	to	limit	
the	choices	of	agents	may	send	a	signal	that	agents	are	untrustworthy.	In	the	case	that	the	rules	are	put	
in	place	by	the	experimenter,	principals	may	infer	that	agents	are	untrustworthy,	and	reduce	trust,	
strategically	or	due	to	betrayal	aversion	motives.	This	can	in	turn	be	self-fulfilling,	if	agents	are	reciprocal	
and	respond	to	low	trust	by	being	untrustworthy.	In	the	case	that	a	principal	is	given	the	option	to	
constrain	the	agent,	and	makes	use	of	the	option,	this	may	signal	to	the	agent	that	the	principal	believes	
they	are	untrustworthy.	This	might	trigger	a	negatively	reciprocal	action	from	the	agent,	in	the	form	of	
reduced	trustworthiness.	As	in	the	game	theory	literature,	it	may	be	optimal	for	principals	to	not	utilize	
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the	possibility	to	adopt	stronger	contract	enforcement,	even	if	this	is	possible	within	the	legal	
framework.	
Laws	that	are	implemented	through	referendum	may	send	a	different	signal,	that	agents	view	
trustworthiness	as	important	and	fair.	In	such	a	process,	individuals	who	vote	for	sanctions	for	
untrustworthy	behavior	will	be	affected	by	the	sanctions	themselves.	Thus,	voting	for	sanctions	tends	to	
signal	that	agents	may	be	intrinsically	trustworthy.	This	might	increase	principals’	willingness	to	trust,	as	
well	as	directly	affect	the	trustworthiness	of	agents	because	they	want	to	conform	to	the	social	norm.	
Indeed,	Tyran	and	Feld	(2006)	measured	beliefs	about	cooperation,	and	show	that	subjects	expected	
greater	cooperation	if	mild	sanctions	were	implemented	by	a	vote,	compared	to	a	setting	where	
sanctions	were	not	an	option.		
In	line	with	this	interpretation,	Jolls,	Sunstein	and	Thaler	(1998)	argue	that	the	content	of	law	should	be	
viewed	as	a	codification	of	what	society	sees	as	right	or	wrong.	For	example,	laws	that	ban	mutually	
beneficially	transactions	like	usury	or	price	gouging	fail	on	the	usual	economic	metrics	of	efficiency	but	
exist	because	they	reflect	prevailing	norms	of	fairness.	Societies	that	have	prevailing	norms	of	trust	and	
trustworthiness	might	also	collectively	choose	stronger	laws	of	enforcement.15	
Whether	or	not	the	law	is	a	complement	to	trust	also	seems	to	depend	on	the	content	of	the	legal	
institution:	strong	laws	do	not	only	mean	perfect	contract	enforcement	between	trading	partners,	they	
may	also	have	an	important	function	in	terms	of	protecting	trading	relationships	from	external	threats	
and	promoting	stability.	The	results	of	Bartling	et	al.	(2014)	highlight	the	complementarity	between	trust	
and	legal	institutions	that	allow	stable	long-term	relationships;	the	combination	of	such	institutions	with	
high	trust	is	very	beneficial,	whereas	having	either	bad	institutions,	or	low	trust,	leads	to	much	worse	
outcomes.	Their	results	also	show	the	importance	of	some	minimal	ability	to	enforce	contractual	terms;	
if	there	is	double	moral	hazard	in	the	sense	that	both	wage	offers	and	worker	effort	levels	are	not	
contractually	enforceable,	then	market	outcomes	are	even	worse,	and	high	initial	trust	beliefs	do	not	
help.	Game	theory	and	psychological	mechanisms	both	provide	explanations	for	how	``gift	exchange’’,	a	
virtuous	cycle	of	trust	and	reciprocal	trustworthiness,	can	arise	in	a	setting	with	repeated	interactions	
and	partial	contractual	enforceability,	although	strictly	speaking	game	theoretic	mechanisms	only	work	
																																								 																				
15	While	Jolls,	Sunstein	and	Thaler	do	not	specify	the	direction	of	causality,	others	have	suggested	that	
law	may	serve	as	a	mechanism	to	shift	the	norms	in	society.	For	example,	Kahan	(2000)	notes	counter-
intuitively	that	the	effectiveness	of	a	new	law	that	contravenes	an	established	norm	in	society	may	be	
decreasing	in	the	severity	of	the	punishment	associated	with	that	law.	The	purported	reason	is	that	
severe	punishments	would	be	seen	by	law	enforcers	as	unjust	and	thus	the	law	would	go	unenforced,	
while	mild	punishments	would	be	accepted	and	help	shift	the	norm	to	match	the	change	in	the	legal	
framework.	More	broadly,	Stout	(2011)	argues	that	laws	should	be	constructed	to	“cultivate	the	
conscience”	of	society	through	the	channels	of	obedience,	conformity	and	empathy	and	the	
overemphasis	of	law	and	economics	on	material	incentives	has	caused	a	neglect	in	a	key	channel	of	how	
law	and	trust	norms	might	interact.		
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with	an	infinite	horizon.	The	ability	to	credibly	promise	high	wages	is	necessary	for	principals	to	be	able	
to	send	a	gift	and	start	the	gift	exchange	process.	The	ability	to	engage	in	repeated	interactions	is	also	
important,	because	in	this	case	agents	have	a	stronger	motive	to	reciprocate	high	trust	and	high	wages	
with	high	effort:	Being	trustworthy	in	the	current	period	increases	the	likelihood	that	the	principal	
chooses	to	interact	with	the	agent	again	in	the	future,	and	continue	to	pay	high	wages.	Trustworthiness	
of	agents	in	term	reinforces	the	willingness	of	principals	to	continue	trusting.	
In	summary,	one	way	to	reconcile	the	apparent	complementarity	of	trust	and	law	at	the	macro	level,	
with	experimental	evidence,	is	to	think	about	the	process	underlying	the	implementation	of	law,	and	the	
precise	content	of	strong	“rule	of	law”.	To	the	extent	that	legal	systems	of	contract	enforcement	are	
seen	as	signaling	a	social	value	placed	on	trust,	as	opposed	to	a	negative	signal	that	people	are	
untrustworthy,	this	could	explain	complementarity	at	the	macro	level.	In	addition,	if	rule	of	law	is	
capturing	features	of	institutions	that	promote	stability	and	the	ability	to	have	long-term	trading	
relationships,	this	is	another	channel	through	which	trust	and	the	law	may	be	complementary.	
Case	Studies	and	Discussion	
Having	discussed	the	relationship	between	trust	and	law	at	a	relatively	general	and	abstract	level,	we	
now	turn	to	a	discussion	of	the	interaction	of	trust	with	several	specific	types	of	laws.	We	focus	on	laws	
that	affect	employment	contracts,	and	laws	that	are	seemingly	designed	to	help	restore	violated	trust,	
so-called	apology	laws	
Employment	Contracts	-	Minimum	Wage,	etc.	
Turning	to	specific	aspects	of	employment	law	that	interact	with	trust,	one	important	case	in	point	is	
minimum	wage	laws.	Increasing	legally	required	minimum	wages	have	been	found	to	produce	
unexpected	effects:	a	tendency	for	firms	to	increase	wages	to	a	level	above	the	new	minimum	wage,	the	
so-called	“spillover	effect,”	and	for	firms	to	not	take	advantage	of	exceptions	in	the	law	to	pay	less	than	
the	minimum	wage	to	certain	groups,	e.g.,	teenagers.		
One	explanation	for	these	effects	is	that	minimum	wage	laws	might	affect	the	perception	of	agents	
about	what	is	a	“fair	wage”	with	consequences	for	the	lowest	wage	workers	are	willing	to	accept.	
Specifically,	Falk	et	al.	(2006)	conduct	experiments	where	the	labor	market	starts	out	with	no	minimum	
wage	law	and	then	one	is	introduced.	Exploiting	the	fact	that	a	lab	experiment	makes	it	possible	to	
directly	measure	worker	reservation	wages	(in	an	incentive	compatible	way),	they	show	that	introducing	
a	higher	minimum	wage	causes	workers	to	increase	their	reservation	wages	to	be	above	the	new	
minimum	wage.	As	a	consequence	of	this	change,	firms	with	rational	beliefs	about	worker	dispositions	
know	that	they	need	to	pay	wages	higher	than	the	new	minimum	wage,	even	if	they	were	paying	lower	
wages	than	the	new	minimum	wage	level	before	the	law	was	introduced.		Workers	in	this	experiment	
demand	higher	wages	even	though	their	outside	option	if	they	refused	the	contract	was	a	payment	of	
zero.	
One	interpretation	of	these	results	is	that	workers	perceive	the	minimum	wage	as	a	signal	about	the	
bare	minimum	a	firm	should	pay	if	it	is	“decent.”	This	might	explain	why	the	fair	wage	is	somewhat	
22	
	
	
higher	than	this	minimum,	as	is	indeed	the	case	with	worker	reservation	wages.	Falk	et	al.	(2006)	also	
conduct	experiments	where	a	minimum	wage	is	first	introduced	and	then	removed.	Strikingly	they	find	
that	reservation	wages	stay	high	even	after	the	minimum	is	eliminated.	Thus,	even	temporary	laws	can	
have	a	lasting	impact	through	the	channel	of	changing	agent	fairness	perceptions.	
Trust	is	also	relevant	when	principals	design	employment	contracts.	Different	forms	of	compensation	
involve	different	degrees	of	trust,	ranging	from	a	binding	up-front	wage,	which	is	paid	regardless	of	the	
agent’s	performance	and	thus	involves	maximum	trust,	to	compensation	being	fully	contingent	on	
performance,	which	reduces	the	need	for	trust	by	the	principal	(Fehr	et	al.,	2007).	In	some	cases,	there	
is	also	an	issue	of	trust	by	the	agent:	for	the	labor	relation	to	be	successful,	the	agent	may	need	to	trust	
that	a	principal	will	actually	pay	a	promised	but	unenforceable	performance	bonus,	or	reward	good	
performance	with	a	future	wage	increase	(e.g.,	Lazear,	1981).	Empirically,	trust	is	shown	to	allow	fixed	
wage	contracts,	or	contracts	that	mix	fixed	wages	with	some	unenforceable	performance	pay,	to	be	
quite	successful.	For	example,	Fehr	et	al.	(2007)	conduct	an	experiment	where	a	principal	and	agent	
have	a	one-shot	interaction.	They	give	principals	the	choice	between	different	contract	forms	and	find	
that	a	contract	combining	a	fixed	up-front	payment	with	the	unenforceable	promise	of	a	bonus	payment	
is	the	most	successful.	This	is	because	subjects	that	are	acting	as	the	firms	in	the	experiment	did	in	fact	
pay	their	promised	bonuses	when	the	worker	performed	well,	despite	the	one-shot	nature	of	the	game.	
Showing	that	they	expect	this	trustworthiness	on	the	part	of	employers,	workers	choose	high	effort	
levels.	By	contrast,	principals	do	worse	with	a	``trust	free’’	contract,	which	automatically	imposes	a	
modest	fine	for	poor	performance	by	the	agent.	The	value	of	flexible	contracts	is	also	demonstrated	by	
Charness	et	al.	(forthcoming	AER),	who	find	in	a	trust	game	experiment	that	principals	can	do	even	
better	if	they	allow	agents	to	set	their	own	wages.	This	is	because	agents	choose	higher	effort	for	a	
given	wage	payment,	when	they	chose	the	wage	level	themselves.		
Employment	protection	legislation	(EPL)	is	another	important	labor	market	institution	that	complicates	
the	relationship	between	principal	and	agent	by	making	firing	costly	if	an	agent	is	retained	beyond	an	
initial	probation	period.	Falk	et	al.	(2014)	use	a	labor	market	experiment	where	firms	and	workers	can	
endogenously	engage	in	repeated	interactions,	and	they	exogenously	vary	whether	the	market	has	EPL,	
and	whether	or	not	bonus	payments	are	possible.	Without	the	option	to	pay	bonuses,	EPL	is	shown	to	
sharply	reduce	market	efficiency	possibly	because	it	forces	firms	to	rely	on	rising	wage	profiles	as	an	
incentive	device.	This	elicits	only	modest	effort	levels	from	workers,	presumably	because	of	the	limited	
credibility	of	large	wage	increases	that	go	into	effect	only	at	the	end	of	the	(finite)	game.	When	bonus	
pay	is	possible,	by	contrast,	EPL	has	little	impact	on	market	efficiency.	This	is	because,	as	in	Fehr	et	al.	
(2007),	firms	use	bonus	pay	and	credibly	reward	workers	for	good	performance	from	the	start.	The	
degree	of	required	trust	is	lower	because	the	principal	must	make	good	on	her	promise	immediately.	
	
Liability	for	Accidents:	Apologies	and	the	Restoration	of	Trust	
One	key	application	of	how	trust	and	specifically	violations	of	trust	interact	with	the	law	is	in	the	realm	
of	tort	law,	particularly	as	applied	to	legal	liability	for	product	defects.	The	relationship	between	a	buyer	
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and	a	seller	when	the	quality	of	the	good	is	uncertain	depends	on	trust.	Liability	provisions	where	the	
buyer	can	seek	recourse	against	the	seller	increases	the	outside	options	for	buyers	and	reduces	the	
relational	incentives	for	the	seller.	We	have	seen	then	that	increasing	the	strength	of	product	liability	
laws	could	decrease	trust.	One	particular	case	study	worth	considering	of	how	laws	interact	with	trust	
relationships	is	in	the	area	of	Apology	Laws.	The	function	of	apologies	has	long	been	seen	as	a	social	
custom	that	mends	frayed	relationships.	Ho	(2012)	shows	that	apologies	act	as	signals	by	agents	for	
future	trustworthy	behavior.	In	the	area	of	medical	malpractice,	states	have	become	concerned	that	one	
cause	of	rising	malpractice	costs	is	that	doctors	are	reluctant	to	apologize	because	they	fear	inviting	
litigation,	but	patients	often	sue	only	because	they	never	received	an	apology.	In	an	effort	to	encourage	
apologies	and	more	trust,	thirty-six	states	have	drafted	apology	laws	that	forbid	plaintiffs	from	using	
apologies	by	doctors	as	evidence	in	court.	However,	like	the	minimal	effort	laws,	apology	laws	also	
interfere	with	the	agent’s	ability	to	signal.	This	is	a	case	where	the	laws	could	serve	as	a	complement	to	
trust,	encouraging	more	trust-generating	apologies,	or	as	a	substitute,	subverting	apologies	by	
diminishing	their	meaning.	Ho	and	Liu	(2011)	find	in	a	difference-in-differences	study	that	the	former	
effect	dominates:	apology	laws	reduce	the	average	size	of	malpractice	payments	while	increasing	the	
speed	of	settlement.	Ho	(2012)	and	Ho	and	Liu	(2011)	point	out	that	the	welfare	implications	of	more	
apologies	and	less	malpractice	is	ambiguous.	As	doctor	effort	is	unobserved	and	standards	of	care	are	
enforced	by	malpractice,	more	apologies	could	increase	moral	hazard	on	the	part	of	doctors.	
Conclusions	
In	this	chapter,	we	offer	a	survey	of	the	literature	on	trust	and	the	law,	exploring	the	behavioral	and	
game	theoretic	mechanisms	that	help	maintain	cooperation	when	contracts	are	incomplete.	Our	
particular	focus	is	on	understanding	the	extent	to	which	trust	and	the	law	are	substitutes	or	
complements.	We	begin	with	evidence	at	the	aggregate,	country	level	that	high	trust	levels	and	strong	
legal	institutions	are	observed	together,	consistent	with	complementarity.	We	then	consider	evidence	
from	laboratory	experiments,	some	of	which	is	consistent	with	trust	being	a	substitute	for	law,	and	
some	of	which	shows	a	complementary	relationship.	A	survey	of	the	evidence	on	behavioral	and	game	
theoretic	mechanisms	that	underlie	trust	helps	shed	some	light	on	the	reasons	for	the	different	results	
in	the	experimental	literature	and	suggests	directions	for	future	research	on	disentangling	the	reasons	
for	the	observed	macroeconomic	behavior.	Understanding	the	relationship	between	trust	and	the	law	
has	important	consequences	for	policy	makers	and	institutional	design	related	to	how	trust	can	support	
or	undermine	the	law,	and	for	practitioners	in	understanding	how	laws	can	support	or	undermine	trust.	
We	understand	relatively	little	about	how	social	trust	and	institutional	rules	co-evolve	over	time	in	a	
dynamic	political	economy	context.	That	suggests	a	next	step	in	research	for	understanding	the	macro	
patterns	we	observe	today.	
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